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Abstract
This paper investigates the effects of monetary rewards on the pattern of re-
search. We build a simple repeated model of a researcher capable to obtain in-
novative ideas. We analyse how the legal environment affects the allocation of
researcher’s time between research and development. Although technology transfer
objectives reduce the time spent in research, they might also induce researchers to
conduct research that is more basic in nature, contrary to what the “skewing prob-
lem” would presage. We also show that our results hold even if development delays
publication.
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1 Introduction
The industrial base of many advanced economies relies heavily on public science, i.e.
knowledge that originates from universities and other public research institutions (Narin
et al., 1997 and McMillan et al., 2000). The prominent role of universities implies that any
change in the research environment is (and should be) widely debated. The Bayh-Dole
Act, which gave American universities the right to own and license inventions emanating
from federally funded research, has certainly been no exception. Since the enactment of
this law more than twenty years ago, patenting by universities, together with licensing
agreements and revenues, has increased dramatically. The 86 universities responding to
the Association of University Technology Managers survey in 1991 and 1998, for example,
reported an increase in patent applications of 176 percent and licenses executed of 131
percent (Jensen et al., 2003).1
Many people have seen this surge in patenting and licensing as a great benefit to soci-
ety. Others, however, worry about the long-term side-effects of the Bayh-Dole act. Voices
have been raised in a variety of societal forums opposing changes that might endanger the
“intellectual commons” and the practices of open science (see e.g., Nelkin, 1984). Because
only private information can be patented, researchers might not be able to publish prelim-
inary results until a patent application has been filed. Some other groups have expressed
concerns about the possibility that monetary rewards might also be affecting the choice
of research projects, “skewing” research from basic towards more applied (Florida and
Cohen, 1999).2 After the costs are recovered, the royalty income is divided between the
university’s transfer office, the faculty members listed as inventors and their departments.
In many of these agreements the faculty can receive as much as 50% of the total royalty
revenue.3
1In recent years, in a large number of EU countries an increase in patenting has also been closely
following the transfer of ownership of patents to universities (Geuna and Nesta, 2006).
2Survey results by Blumenthal et al. (1986) indicate that faculty members whose research is supported
by the industry are four times more likely than faculty without such support to report that their choices
of research topics have been affected by the chance that the results would have commercial application.
3Lach and Schankerman (2003) provide strong empirical support for the importance of inventor’s
royalty shares for university performance in terms of inventions and licence income.
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Still, many directors of technology transfer offices believe that substantially less than
half of the inventions with commercial potential are disclosed to their offices (Jensen
et al., 2003). Some of them may not be disclosed because the inventor is not able to
realise the potential commercial value but in many other cases the inventor does not
want to take time away from research. Faculty involvement in further development is
necessary for commercial success, since most of the innovations licensed are at an early
stage of development (Jensen and Thursby, 2001). And, researchers are not only driven by
monetary rewards, as other non-academic entrepreneurs, but also by peer recognition and
the “puzzle” joy (Stephan and Levin, 1992). Academic freedom to define research topics
and methods has high importance for faculty members even if they lack applicability in
the short run. Researchers’ preferences are reinforced by the academic tenure process and
the reward and merit systems that put the emphasis in scientific publications.
This paper proposes a framework to analyse the effects of monetary rewards on the
pattern of research. We build a simple repeated model of a researcher capable to obtain
innovative ideas. Indeed, in each period, she may decide to undertake research, which
has an uncertain outcome. Alternatively, she may decide to develop existing research into
a potentially commercially valuable innovation. If she does so, however, the researcher
forgoes the opportunity of continue undertaking innovative research and therefore of re-
ceiving a new idea in that period. We analyse, in the first place, how the legal environment
affects the allocation of researcher’s (fixed amount of) time, which depends on her individ-
ual characteristics and on the academic and market incentives. Not surprisingly, higher
monetary rewards induces the researcher to develop more and therefore to spend less time
on research.
We argue, however, that technology transfer objectives also affect the choice of research
projects within researchers’ discipline. At least according to one measure, researchers
should have incentives to conduct more basic research, contrary to what the “skewing
problem” would suggest. Indeed, we show that the introduction of monetary rewards
induces researchers to increase the level of risk of their research programs. Although risk
is associated with all forms of research, high uncertainty is an inherent characteristic of
basic research. As Nelson (1959) states in his seminal paper, “the line between basic
scientific research and applied scientific research is hard to draw. There is a continuous
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spectrum of scientific activity. Moving from the applied-science end of the spectrum to the
basic-science end, the degree of uncertainty about the results of specific research projects
increases”. Therefore our model shows that although financial incentives induce faculty
to spend less time doing research, they might also prompt researchers to select scientific
projects that are more basic in nature.
Although the choice of research projects cannot be measured directly, existing indi-
rect evidence suggests that the much-feared switch from basic to applied research is not
occurring. Thursby and Thursby (2002) conclude that changes in the direction of fac-
ulty research seem to be relatively less important than other factors in explaining the
increased licensing activity. Using faculty-level data from six major universities, Thursby
and Thursby (2007) find no systematic change in the proportion of publications in basic
versus applied journals between 1983 and 1999.4 They also report that the total number
of publications per faculty member more than doubled over the time period, indicating
that the number of publications in basic journals has actually increased. A decrease in
the quality of university patents could also be taken as an indication of a trend towards
more applied research. Although Henderson et al. (1998) do find a decreasing trend in
the quality of university patents (measured by the number of forward citations), Mowery
et al. (2001), Mowery at al. (2002) and Mowery and Ziedonis (2002) argue that this is
due to an increased number of new and inexperienced technology transfer offices rather
than to a systemic change in the nature of academic research.
Our framework generates comparative statics results that are consistent with a variety
of stylised facts related to individual characteristics such as age and tenure and other
characteristics such as discipline. The model also allows us to examine further implications
and suggest additional tests. We extend for example our basic model to analyse the effects
of increased secrecy, the inability to publish results until the end of the development
period. We compare how the allocation of time and the selection of research projects
change with respect to the case in which development does not delay academic publication.
We show that although the researcher develops less often than without secrecy, she might
still select projects that are riskier. Therefore, the introduction of monetary incentives
4Hicks and Hamilton (1999) also found that the percentage of basic research that was performed at
American universities remained unchanged between 1981 and 1995.
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might induce research that is more basic in nature, even if development delays publication,
albeit the effect should be weaker than without delay.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that models the impact of the
introduction of financial incentives on the choice of research projects. It is important to
note that we are concentrating on early-stage academic research. Aghion et al. (2005),
instead, study the respective advantages and disadvantages of academia and the private
sector at different stages and show that university researchers are more effective at an
early stage.5 Closer to our work, Lacetera (2006b) compares the incentives of academic
and industrial researchers to perform additional research into a given project prior to
commercialisation. In contrast, this paper concentrates on the choice between undertak-
ing new research and spending time in development and commercialisation of existing
research.6 Thursby et al. (2005) analyse the impact of licensing on the time spent on
basic and applied research in a life cycle context. They show that basic research does not
need to suffer from licensing if basic and applied research effort are complementary. In
our model, we show that even if applied work does not improve future research outcomes,
researchers might choose projects that are more basic in nature.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic
model. Section 3 analyse the allocation of time and Section 4 the choice of research
projects. Section 5 extends the basic model to accommodate the effects of increased
secrecy. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Model
Consider the following repeated model of a risk-neutral researcher. In each period, she
spends her time either working in a new research project or developing existing research.
If she pursues new research she obtains, at the end of the period, an “idea” of random
5Using a closely related model Lacetera (2006a) studies firms’ determinants to outsource research
projects to academic organisations, focusing instead on duration and breadth.
6Several papers have analysed the relations between the university and the industry. Macho-Stadler
et al. (1996) and Jensen and Thursby (2001) for example analyse the optimal contract between the
university and the company. Our development period is a reduced form of this relationship. It bundles
together development time, finding a buyer and so on.
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quality q, drawn from an independent and identical distribution F (q) with density f(q)
and support [0, Q].7 Indeed, our formulation emphasises the fact that the outcome of
any research project is inherently uncertain. The research output has theoretical content
and potential market value. The theoretical content is publishable in a scientific journal
and it does not jeopardise further patent rights.8 The researcher derives a utility of αq,
where α denotes the marginal benefit of the quality of the publication to the researcher.
This parameter may reflect the tenure or recognition concerns or the possibility to obtain
financing from public grants.
In the following period, the researcher may undertake new research and obtain, at
the end of the period, a new idea. Alternatively, she can develop the idea of the previous
period, transforming it into an innovation, but forgoing the opportunity of receiving a new
idea in that period. At the end of the period of development, the commercial value of an
output of quality q is given by μq.9’10 The parameter μ may be linked to the discipline;
engineering, for example, may have a higher μ than physical sciences. It may also reflect
the difficulty of finding a company interested in licensing inventions at this early stage of
development. Faculty involvement is necessary for commercial success and therefore we
assume that without this period of development, the idea does not have any commercial
value.
When selling the innovation the researcher receives a share s (∈ (0, 1)) of the benefits
that accrue to the company. These benefits depend on the market value of the innovation
as well as on the costs of turning the innovation into a final commercial product. We
7Effort and capacity issues are given and subsumed in the support and in the distribution. In the
basic model, given the researcher’s specialisation and capabilities, the distribution of results is exogenous.
8We discuss in Section 5 what happens if there is a conflict between publication and confidentiality
required for patenting.
9For notational simplicity, we assume that the applicability factor is certain. It would be equivalent
to assume the commercial value is eμq, with eμ being an independently and identically distributed random
factor with E(eμ) = μ. As long as the applicability factor is not observed until the end of the period, its
realisation is not relevant for the development decision.
10We assume that when sold the quality of the innovation is verifiable. The literature on markets for
technology suggests the use of a menu of fixed fees and royalties or equity to signal the quality of the
invention or to separate bad applications of the technology from good ones (Gallini and Wright, 1990,
Macho-Stadler and Pérez-Castrillo, 1991, and Beggs, 1992).
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denote by A the cost of making the innovation a commercial product, that is assumed to
be paid by the firm. To make the problem interesting we need to assume that μQ > A
since, otherwise, it would never be interesting to develop any idea.
This model is infinitely repeated and time is discounted by δ (∈ (0, 1)).11 An advantage
of this formulation is that our results are not distorted by the existence of a final date.
The model, however, is not dynamic in the sense that there are no differences between
periods, i.e. there is neither learning from past research nor accumulation of capabilities
over time. While these dimensions are important, this paper aims, as a first step, at
studying the simplest situation where the university-researchers are confronted with the
research versus development decision.
3 Time Allocation
After obtaining an idea q in the previous period the researcher decides, at the beginning
of the new period, whether to develop this idea further into a potentially commercially
valuable project or to work in a new research project. This decision depends on the
expected market value of the idea and on the opportunity cost of the time to develop it.
To characterise the optimal allocation of time in function of the exogenous parameters
we proceed in two steps. We first state the optimal decision in function of any exogenous
“research continuation value” V , defined as discounted present expected value of the
utility stream of a researcher at the beginning of a period in which she does research.
Lemma 1 For any research continuation value V , there is a unique q◦(V ) such that the
researcher will not develop if and only if q ≤ q◦(V ).
Proof. The researcher will be able to sell the innovation if the value for the firm is larger
than the costs. This defines two intervals, [0, Aμ ) and [
A
μ , Q], depending on the value of q.
11We chose to model behaviour using an infinite horizon because, as argued by Osborne and Rubinstein
(1994) in pp. 135, "a model with an infinite horizon is appropriate if after each period the players believe
that the game will continue for an additional period, while a model with a finite horizon is appropriate if
the players clearly perceive a well-defined period. The fact that players have finite lives, for example, does
not imply that one should always model their interaction as a finitely repeated game." We are therefore
modelling behaviour in most of the researcher’s career, except when she approaches retirement.
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If q < Aμ then the researcher will not develop for any V since she will never be able to sell
anyway, αq + δV ≥ αq + δ2V. If Aμ ≤ q ≤ Q then she will be able to sell the innovation if
she develops and therefore she will develop whenever αq + δs [μq −A] + δ2V ≤ αq + δV ,
or equivalently, when (1− δ)V ≥ s [μq −A].
Denoting m(q) ≡ s [μq −A], the previous discussion implies that, for all V , q◦(V ) is
given by m(q◦(V )) = (1 − δ)V when m(Q) > (1 − δ)V and q◦(V ) = Q when m(Q) ≤
(1− δ)V. Given that m(Q) > 0 (by assumption μQ−A > 0), in order to show that there
exists a unique q◦(V ), we need to show that m(q) is an increasing function and m(0) < 0.
Indeed, m0(q) = sμ > 0 and m(0) = −sA < 0.
For any exogenous continuation value, the researcher switches to a new research project
unless she obtains a research output that, after being developed, it has enough commercial
prospects. We are now ready to characterise the cutoff q◦ and present value V in function
of the exogenous parameters of the model. Denote as q the expected value of q.
Proposition 2 The optimal decision of the researcher is not to develop research output
whose quality q < q◦, where q◦ is defined as follows:
(a) q◦ = Q when αq ≥ s (μQ−A) .
(b) s (μq◦ −A) = αq + δsμ
R Q
q◦ (x− q◦) dF (x) when αq < s (μQ−A) .
The discounted present expected value V for the researcher is,
V = 1
1−δ
h
αq + δsμ
R Q
q◦ (x− q◦) dF (x)
i
.
Proof. Suppose firstly that the cut-off chosen by the researcher is q◦ = Q. The researcher
never develops and never sells. Hence V =
R Q
0
αxdF (x) + δV , which simplifying gives
V = 1
1−δαq. The decision q
◦ = Q is optimal if and only if (1− δ)V ≥ s [μQ−A], which
substituting gives αq ≥ s (μQ−A) , which corresponds to the region in part (a).
Suppose secondly that the cut-off chosen by the researcher is q◦ < Q. We have that
V =
Z Q
0
αxdF (x) + δF (q◦)V + δs
Z Q
q◦
(μx−A) dF (x) + [1− F (q◦)] δ2V,
which simplifying gives
(1− δ) (1 + δ [1− F (q◦)])V = αq + δs
Z Q
q◦
(μx−A) dF (x).
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On the other hand, the optimal q◦(V ) should be defined here as (1− δ)V = s [μq◦ −A].
Hence,
(1 + δ [1− F (q◦)]) s [μq◦ −A] = αq + δs
Z Q
q◦
(μx−A) dF (x).
Simplifying we have that q◦ is implicitly defined by
j(q◦) ≡ s (μq◦ −A)− δsμ
Z Q
q◦
(x− q◦) dF (x) = αq.
Since j0(q) = sμ+ δsμ(1− F (q)) > 0, the cut-off q◦ is unique. Finally, we need to check
that q◦ ≤ Q. Since j(q◦) = αq and j0(q) > 0, we need that j(Q) ≥ αq or s (μQ−A) ≥ αq,
which corresponds to the region in part (b).
The intuition behind Proposition 2 is simple. First, if the (academic) value of the
average publication is, in monetary terms, higher than the payment from the best inno-
vation, the researcher will never develop an idea (part a). If this is not the case, then the
researcher will develop her best ideas while dropping the worse ones (part b). The quality
in which the researcher is indifferent is such that the monetary reward after development
is equal to the expected opportunity cost of a period’s time; namely, the academic reward
of the average publication plus the expected monetary reward from an innovation derived
from a research output of higher quality.
From the previous equations, it is easy to show which changes of the exogenous para-
meters induce the researcher to develop more often; that is, when the region of part (a)
of Proposition 2 (in which the researcher never develops) shrinks and/or the threshold
within the region in part (b) (in which she might develop) is lower.
Corollary 3 The researcher develops more often, when
(a) the applicability factor, μ, increases;
(b) the costs of turning an innovation into a commercial product, A, decreases;
(c) the share of the benefits received by the researcher, s, increases;
(d) the marginal utility of the quality of the publication, α, decreases;
(e) the discount factor, δ, decreases.
As one would anticipate, a higher marginal commercial value of the innovation, μ,
and a lower cost of turning the innovation into a commercial product, A, induce more
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development. Indeed, the empirical results by Thursby and Thursby (2007) confirm that
the probability that a researcher discloses in a given year is higher in more applied fields
such as engineering and in fields in which the results are in strong demand by the industry
such as biological sciences. Assuming that the marginal utility of academic publication α
decreases with tenure and age, part (c) is consistent with the fact that disclosure increases
with tenure and age, at least until the middle ages (Thursby and Thursby, 2007).
More interestingly, if the future is little valued (δ low), then researchers do not lose
much from developing in this period and foregoing the possibility of obtaining a better
research outcome. As a result, they develop more often. An alternative interpretation of
the discount rate δ is the rate at which ideas are obtained. The corollary implies that a
more prolific researcher (with a high δ) should be more reluctant to develop a given idea.
Although she might end up developing more or less in total, the commercial value of her
average innovation should definitely be higher.
Also intuitively, stronger monetary incentives (a higher s) and a lower emphasis in
publications (a lower α) induce more development. The combination (α, s) would be
determined by the university and would depend on the university objectives, a matter
that is beyond the aim of this paper. Nevertheless, it is important to stress that for the
incentive to commercialise inventions to be effective, it is necessary that the parameters
satisfy αq ≥ s [μQ−A] or q
[μQ−A] <
s
α . Still there might be a minimum α established by
competition for researchers and/or a maximum s coming from the relationship with the
market. Hence, whenever q
[μQ−A] is very high, either because the quality of the area of
research is very high or because the discipline has not marketable applications, it may
not be possible to provide incentives to commercialise.
So far we have assumed that all researchers were obtaining ideas from the same pool.
However, better researchers might have access to better pools. In order to understand
whether better researchers develop more or less often we briefly suppose that different
researchers have access to pools that differ in the support of the distribution, [∆, Q+∆]
for some ∆ ≥ 0. Better researchers should have a higher ∆. For simplicity, for any ∆, the
distribution of quality is assumed to be uniform.
Corollary 4 Assume that the research output is uniformly distributed over [∆, Q + ∆]
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for ∆ ≥ 0. Better researchers (higher ∆) develop more often if and only if α
2
< sμ.
Proof. The optimal cutoff in part (b) in Proposition 2 for a uniform distribution function
between [∆, Q+∆] is given by G(q◦, Q,∆) = 0 where
G(q,Q,∆) ≡ s (μq −A)− αQ+∆
2
− sδμ
2Q
(Q+∆− q)2 .
The researcher develops more often when getting better results as long as ∂∂∆(Q +
∆ − q◦) > 0 or as long as ∂∂∆q◦ < 1. Applying the implicit function theorem, we have
that ∂G∂∆ = −
sδμ
2Q 2 (Q+∆− q) − α
1
2
and ∂G∂q = sμ +
sδμ
2Q (Q+∆− q) and therefore
∂q◦
∂∆ =
− ∂G∂∆/
∂G
∂q < 1 as long as
sδμ
2Q 2 (Q+∆− q)+α
1
2
< sμ+ sδμ
2Q (Q+∆− q), which is equivalent
to α
2
< sμ.
Gifted with research outputs of higher academic value, a researcher should on the one
hand have more incentives to do more research and therefore develop less because her
ideas have a higher academic value. On the other hand, she should have more incentives
to develop because patents would also be more lucrative. The academic and commercial
marginal values determine which effect is stronger. Indeed, in an institution with a low
emphasis in publications and a high in development (case α/2 < sμ in Corollary 4), better
researchers develop more.12 In contrast in an institution more prone to reward academic
excellence, better researchers should be those that develop less.
The previous corollary also hints at the dynamic consequences of working in a research
or business oriented university. If one assumes that more senior researchers obtain better
research output, the previous proposition predicts that researchers in research-oriented
institutions will devote more and more time to research as time goes by. In contrast,
senior researchers in more business oriented institutions or in more applied fields should
devote more time to development than junior ones. We are not aware of any empirical
test along these lines, although there is evidence that scientists become on average less
productive as they get older (Stephan and Levin, 1992 and Jones, 2005).
12Debackere and Veugelers (2005) show that top generators of new technology ventures and industrial
contract volumes in the KU of Leuven in Belgium also tend to be among the top performers in terms of
academic research.
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4 Basic or Applied Research Projects
We now turn to the controversial question of how the introduction of remuneration affects
the choice of research projects. A potential difference between basic and more applied re-
search projects is that the outcomes of applied projects can be more easily commercialised
or, in other words, the costs A of turning the innovation into a commercial product are
lower. Also, peer recognition and the expected value of publication (measured by the
parameter α) can be lower for more applied projects. The next proposition confirms that,
according to this distinction, researchers will be more likely to choose applied projects in
the presence of financial incentives.
Proposition 5 The introduction of remuneration for commercial inventions is conducive
to a selection of projects with lower costs of development and lower academic value (“more
applied”). By choosing these projects, researchers spend more time in development and
less in research.
Proof. To prove this result, suppose that there are two projects characterised by the
parameters (α1, A1) and (α2, A2), with A1 > A2 and α1 > α2, but otherwise identical.
Project 1 is more basic than project 2. According to Proposition 2, we can write the
discounted present expected value for each project i = 1, 2 as
Vi(s) =
1
1− δ [s (μq
◦
i (s)−Ai)] ,
where Vi and q◦i are functions of the share s. The researcher prefers the applied project
(project 2) if and only if
q◦1(s)− q◦2(s) <
A1 −A2
μ
.
From Proposition 2 and Corollary 3, one can show that ∂
2qo
∂s∂α < 0 and
∂2qo
∂s∂A < 0. As
a consequence, q◦1(s0) − q◦2(s0) < q◦1(s00) − q◦2(s00) whenever s0 > s00. This implies that the
researcher is more inclined to choose the applied project the larger is the share s. Indeed,
if she chooses project 2 when the share is s00, she will keep preferring that project for the
larger share s0. However, the increase in s can make the researcher switch from project 1
to project 2. The second part of the Proposition follows directly from Corollary 3.
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However, as argued in the introduction one of the other main differences between basic
and applied projects is that basic projects are riskier than applied projects (Nelson, 1959).
In what follows, we will show that according to this distinction, researchers will be more
willing to choose projects that are more basic in nature. Suppose that the researcher can
costlessly choose the level of risk of her research projects, assuming that the mean and
the support are identical.
Proposition 6 The introduction of remuneration for commercial inventions induces re-
searchers to select riskier projects (“more basic”). By choosing riskier projects, researchers
are more reluctant to develop a given outcome, although they might develop more or less
in expected terms.
Proof. To prove this result, consider two distributions, F1(q) and F2(q), with the same
support [0, Q] and with the same mean (q), and F2(q) being a mean preserving spread
of (i.e. riskier than) F1(q). By definition (see e.g., Mas-Colell et al., 1995, Chapter 6),R
u(x)dF2(x) ≥
R
u(x)dF1(x) for any u(x) defined inR+, non-decreasing and non-concave.
Given that u(x) = 0 if x [0, q] and u(x) = x− q if x [q,Q] satisfies these conditions, we
have that
R Q
q (x− q) dF2(x) ≥
R Q
q (x− q) dF1(x).
If s is small, the parameters of the model are in the region of part (a) of Proposition
2. In this region, the researcher is indifferent between the two distributions. If s is high
enough, the parameters are in the region of part (b). Given F1(q), the threshold quality
qo1 is defined as:
s (μqo1 −A)− δsμ
Z Q
qo1
(x− qo1) dF1(x) = αq.
Since F2(.) is a mean preserving spread of F1(.), we have that
s (μqo1 −A)− δsμ
Z Q
qo1
(x− qo1) dF2(x) < αq.
Given that the derivative of the left hand with respect to qo1 is positive and that
s (μqo2 −A)− δsμ
Z Q
qo2
(x− qo2) dF2(x) = αq,
we have that qo2 > qo1. As shown in the proof of the previous proposition, this implies that
V2 > V1 and therefore the researcher prefers the risky research project.
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Figure 1: Researcher’s utility in a given period (for a given V) as a function of the quality
of the idea.
The intuition behind the preference for the risky project follows from the fact that
the researcher acts as if she was risk-lover with respect to the quality of the output.
As we can see in Figure 1, researcher’s utility as a function of the output quality is a
convex function. Indeed, for a given V , the utility is the maximum of two affine functions
that represent the value from continuing doing research (αq + δV ) and the value from
development (αq + δs [μq −A] + δ2V ). The latter is steeper because better output have
higher development value. The former has a higher intercept because the researcher
obtains a new idea sooner. As shown in Proposition 2, as long as the remuneration for
the best innovation is high enough, the two lines cross at some point qo.
By choosing riskier projects, researchers are more reluctant to develop a given idea.
Indeed, they are more likely to obtain a better idea in the next period and therefore they
are more willing to drop the current one. As shown in Figure 2, though, they might
end up developing more ideas in expected terms. Although F2(x) is a mean preserving
spread of F1(x) and therefore the threshold for the former is higher (qo2 > qo1), the ex-ante
probability of developing is higher for the former than it is for the latter (F2(qo2) < F1(qo1)).
Although the academic andmonetary rewards were assumed to be linearly increasing in
the quality of the output, this result should hold more generally. Indeed, the introduction
of monetary rewards induce the researcher to select between two increasing functions.
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Figure 2: Distribution F1(·) and a mean preserving spread, F2(·) (Area A=Area B).
Assume that the commercial value of an idea of quality q is μ(q)q. Given that the best
innovations have much higher value than intermediate ones, μ(q) would typically be not
constant as in our model but increasing. This would make the researcher even more
risk-lover than with no rewards from technology transfer. Further, the fact that the
researcher selects riskier projects than with no monetary rewards should hold if the value
of publications has the form α(q)q for any α(q) and not only when α(q) is constant.
Indeed, although she might not always act as if she was risk-lover she would exhibit more
risk-loving behaviour than before the introduction of monetary rewards.
The previous two propositions have identified two opposite effects of financial incen-
tives on the choice of research projects. Monetary rewards induce a shift towards more
applied or towards more basic depending on which of these two effects is stronger. Of
course, if more applied projects have much lower development costs, then researchers
choose more applied research projects even if they are less risky. On the other hand,
researchers choose research projects that are riskier if the difference in development costs
is not large. That is, financial incentives should not necessarily “skew” research towards
more applied projects, as the recent evidence mentioned in the introduction also seems
to suggest. In the next section, we investigate whether this depends on the fact that we
have so far assumed that commercialisation does not delay publication.
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5 Increased Secrecy
There is evidence that a delay in scientific publication has occurred on results that have
been the subject of a patent application (see e.g. Geuna and Nesta, 2006). To analyse
how this dimension might affect our results, we assume in this section that if the research
outcome is to be developed, the researcher cannot publish it in a scientific journal until
the end of the development period. To make things interesting, we need to assume here
that the loss from delaying publication until the next period is lower than the monetary
value from development (i.e., δsμ > (1 − δ)α). Otherwise, the researcher would never
develop. Following the same procedure as before, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 7 The optimal decision of the researcher is not to develop research output
whose quality q < qs, where qs is defined as follows:
(a) qs = Q when δαq ≥ sδ (μQ−A)− (1− δ)αQ.
(b) s [μqs −A] = αq+ (1−δ)δ αqs+
R Q
qs (δsμ− (1− δ)α) (x− q◦) dF (x) when δαq <
sδ (μQ−A)− (1− δ)αQ.
The discounted present expected value V for the researcher is,
V = 1
(1−δ)
h
αq +
R Q
qs (δsμ− (1− δ)α) (x− qs) dF (x)
i
.
Proof. See the Appendix
That is, the marginal idea is such that the monetary value at the end of the period
is equal to the opportunity cost of time, equal to the average value of a research output,
the lost value of publishing later, and the lost possibility of having a better output, which
can be developed but of course at the cost of delaying publication one period.
The following corollary shows that although the researcher develop less than if devel-
opment does not delay publication, she still prefers a riskier (i.e. more basic) project.
Corollary 8 The researcher develops less often and she is worse off when there is in-
creased secrecy. She would still choose to select riskier rather than safer projects.
Proof. See the Appendix
As we can see in the dashed lines in Figure 3, publication delay makes development
less attractive. As a result the researcher develops less often (qs > q◦). Further, she would
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Figure 3: Researcher’s utility in a given period with (dashed line) and without secrecy.
still select riskier rather than safer projects because the utility is still convex (remember
that sδμ > (1− δ)α). However, she acts as she was less risk-lover than before. Although
the introduction of monetary incentives still induces research that is more basic in the
presence of delay, the effect is weaker than without delay. More generally, if the researcher
were risk-averse, she might be more prone to select safer or more applied projects than in
the case of no secrecy.
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper analyses some of the “unintended” effects of government policies that increase
the incentives to transfer university research into the market, such as the Bayh-Dole Act.
An important concern is whether financial incentives aimed at promoting commerciali-
sation affects the choice of research projects. To understand the behaviour of university
researchers, we build a simple repeated model to study the allocation of time in function
of the individual characteristics and of the academic and market incentives.
We show that the researcher should pursue a new research project unless the quality
of the outcome has enough commercial prospects to compensate a delay in undertaking
new research. The opportunity costs of development and commercialisation include not
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only scientific output but also the opportunity to obtain a more lucrative innovation.
Consistent with the empirical evidence, our comparative statics results indicate that a
researcher spends more time developing if her discipline has greater applicability and if
the marginal utility of academic publications is lower.
We also analyse how the coexistence of publications and technology transfer rewards
affects the choice between basic and applied research programs. We show that the in-
troduction of researcher remuneration for commercial inventions pushes the researcher to
prefer riskier projects. Given that higher levels of uncertainty are related to more basic
research, the introduction of monetary rewards might not only preserve but also enhance
the choice of more basic research projects. As a result, although less time might now be
spent on research, this research might be more basic in nature than before.
Our model is not only consistent with a variety of stylised facts but it also generates
a number of additional testable predictions. On the development side, by choosing riskier
projects, researchers should be more reluctant to develop research of a low quality. Instead,
they are more willing to continue undertaking research because they are more likely to
obtain results of higher quality in the future. As a result, it might be that they end up
developing less as monetary rewards increase. Indirect evidence from this can also be
found in Thursby and Thursby (2007), who state that “the much publicized increase in
licensing activity appears to be concentrated among a minority of faculty”. We predict
however that the commercial value of the projects that are actually developed is higher.
Again, indirect evidence suggests that most of the patenting revenues are concentrated
among a reduced number of patents. Although the level of invention disclosures, patent
applications and licenses executed increased by 84%, 238% and 161% respectively from
1991 until 2000, the royalty revenue increased by 520% in the same period.
On the research side, a selection of riskier projects should lead to a more spread dis-
tribution of the quality of the publications. Empirically, one could analyse whether the
quality of the publications, measured for example in citations, of researchers in depart-
ments in which monetary rewards are larger is more spread.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 7
Again, the researcher never expects to sell the innovation if q < Aμ . If
A
μ ≤ q ≤ Q
she will develop whenever δαq + δs [μq −A] + δ2V ≥ αq + δV , or equivalently, when
δ(1− δ)V ≤ sδ [μq −A]− (1− δ)αq.
For any continuation value V , there is again a unique qs(V ) such that the researcher
will not develop. This is the case if and only if q ≤ qs(V ). Indeed, denoting m(q) ≡
sδ [μq −A]− (1− δ)αq, for any V , qs(V ) is given by m(qs(V )) = δ(1− δ)V when m(Q) >
δ(1− δ)V and qs(V ) = Q when m(Q) ≤ δ(1−δ)V. Given that m0(q) = sδμ− (1− δ)α > 0
and m(0) = −sA < 0 there exists a unique qs(V ).
Now, suppose firstly that the cut-off chosen by the researcher is qs = Q. The researcher
never develops and never sells. Hence, V =
R Q
0
αxdF (x)+δV , which simplifying gives V =
1
1−δαq. The decision q
s = Q is optimal if and only if δ(1−δ)V ≥ sδ [μQ−A]−(1−δ)αQ,
which substituting gives δαq ≥ sδ (μQ−A)− (1− δ)αQ, which corresponds to the region
in part (a).
Suppose secondly that the cut-off chosen by the researcher is qs < Q. Since she sells
if and only if she develops, we have that
V =
Z qs
0
αxdF (x)+ δ
Z Q
qs
αxdF (x)+ δF (qs)V + δs
Z Q
qs
(μx−A) dF (x)+ [1− F (qs)] δ2V,
which simplifying gives
(1− δ) (1 + δ [1− F (qs)])V =
Z qs
0
αxdF (x) + δ
Z Q
qs
αxdF (x) + δs
Z Q
qs
(μx−A) dF (x).
On the other hand, the optimal qs(V ) should be defined as δ(1 − δ)V = sδ [μqs −A] −
(1− δ)αqs. Substituting in the previous equation and simplifying,
s [μqs −A] = αq + (1− δ)
δ
αqs +
Z Q
qs
(δsμ− (1− δ)α) (x− qs) dF (x).
In other words, qs is implicitly defined by g(qs) = 0, where
g(qs) ≡ s [μqs −A]−αq−
Z Q
qs
δsμ (x− qs) dF (x)−(1− δ)
δ
αqs+
Z Q
qs
(1−δ)α (x− qs) dF (x) = 0.
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We have that g0(q) > 0 and g(0) < 0. Indeed,
g0(q) =
1
δ
£
δsμ+ δ2sμ(1− F (qs))− α(1− δ) + δ(1− δ)α [1− F (qs)]
¤
> 0
and
g(0) = s(−A)− αq −
Z Q
0
δsμxdF (x) +
Z Q
0
(1− δ)αxdF (x) < 0,
because of our initial assumption (sδμ− (1− δ)α > 0). In order to have a unique cutoff
qs we need that
g(Q) =
1
δ
(δs [μQ−A]− δαq − (1− δ)αQ) > 0,
which corresponds to the region in part (b).
Substituting,
V =
1
(1− δ)
∙
αq +
Z Q
qs
(δsμ− (1− δ)α) (x− qs) dF (x)
¸
.
Proof of Corollary 8
The cut-off point of our baseline case q◦ satisfies
s [μq◦ −A]− αq −
Z Q
q◦
δsμ (x− q◦) dF (x) = 0,
and therefore, in particular,
q◦ −
Z Q
q◦
δ (x− q◦) dF (x) > 0.
We have that g(q◦) < 0, where g(·) is defined in the previous proof, because
g(q◦) =
(1− δ)
δ
α
∙
−q◦ + δ
Z Q
q◦
(x− q◦) dF (x)
¸
< 0.
Therefore, given that g is increasing and at q◦ is negative and at qs is 0, we have that
q◦ < qs.
We have that V s < V ◦ if and only ifZ Q
qs
(δsμ− (1− δ)α) (x− qs) dF (x) <
Z Q
q◦
δsμ (x− q◦) dF (x),
which is true if and only ifZ Q
qs
δsμ (x− qs) dF (x)−
Z Q
q◦
δsμ (x− q◦) dF (x)−
Z Q
qs
(1− δ)α (x− qs) dF (x) < 0.
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Defining n(q) ≡
R Q
q δsμ (x− q) dF (x) and given that n0(q) = −δsμ (1− F (q)) < 0, we
have that the first two terms are negative and so is the third.
To prove that researchers still prefer riskier projects, consider as before two distrib-
utions, F1(q) and F2(q), with the same support and the latter being a mean preserving
spread of the former. In the region of part (a), the researcher is indifferent between the
two distributions. In the region of part (b), given F1(q), the threshold quality qs1 is defined
as:
s [μqs1 −A]− αq −
(1− δ)
δ
αqs1 −
Z Q
qs1
(δsμ− (1− δ)α) (x− qs1) dF1(x) = 0.
Since F2(.) is a mean preserving spread of F1(.), we have that
s [μqs1 −A]− αq −
(1− δ)
δ
αqs1 −
Z Q
qs1
(δsμ− (1− δ)α) (x− qs1) dF2(x) < 0.
Given that the derivative of the left hand side is equal to
sμ− (1− δ)
δ
α+ (δsμ− (1− δ)α) (1− F2(qs1)) > 0,
and that
s [μqs2 −A]− αq −
(1− δ)
δ
αqs2 −
Z Q
qs2
(δsμ− (1− δ)α) (x− qs2) dF2(x) = 0,
we have that qs2 > qs1. From Proposition 6, V =
1
(1−δ)
h
s [μqs −A]− (1−δ)δ αqs
i
, and hence
we have that V2 > V1 and therefore the researcher prefers the risky pool.
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